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I. INTRODUCTION

Under both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure, every claim for relief must contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .
.” 1 The notion behind this rule is that “[t]he complaint should put the
defendant on notice of the claims against him.” 2 Exactly how much
substantive notice does Rule 8 require that a defendant have?3
According to a literal reading of the rule of law in Conley v. Gibson,4
and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Northern States Power Co.
v. Franklin, 5 Rule 8 does not require much substantive notice at all. In
Conley, the High Court held the following:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of
course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.6
Similarly, in Franklin, the Minnesota Supreme Court held: “A claim
is sufficient against a motion to dismiss based on Rule [12.02(e)] if it is
possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the
pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.”7 This liberal view of notice
pleading limits the concept of “notice” to disclosing the theory of recovery,
1

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Minn. 2006) (citing L.K. v. Gregg,
425 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Minn. 1988)).
3
See infra Part II (explaining how courts interpret Rule 8).
4
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957).
5
N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963).
6
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
7
Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29 (emphasis added).
2
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providing enough information to permit application of res judicata, and
advising whether a jury or bench trial is required.8
Functionally, the Conley rule and the Franklin rule are synonymous.9
Read literally, both rules describe the minimum standard of adequate
pleading to govern a complaint’s survival in terms of what the plaintiff can
prove. 10 The discovery process, not the quality of a complaint’s factual
allegations, determines what the plaintiff ultimately might prove and what
evidence the plaintiff ultimately might produce. 11 Therefore, literal
application of both rules practically guarantees that a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim will be denied if it challenges a complaint’s factual
substance.12
Federal pleading and Rule 12 motion jurisprudence changed in 2007
when the Supreme Court of the United States decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.13 Twombly overruled Conley and redefined Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
in a way that requires every claim for relief to contain a minimal level of
factual substance in order to survive a motion to dismiss.14 It held that a
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.”15 Without defining “plausibility” in any exact terms,
the Court said that this plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege
“enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal”
evidence of alleged wrongdoing.16 Two years later, the High Court extended
Twombly in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,17 holding that the plausibility standard applies
to claims for relief in all federal civil actions.18 Both decisions hold that a
complaint consisting of nothing more than legal conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of a claim’s elements will not suffice to state an actionable claim
for relief.19 Thus, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), every claim for relief must
provide a minimal level of factual substance showing that the pleader is
entitled to the demanded relief.20
8

See id.; Roberge v. Cambridge Coop. Creamery Co., 67 N.W.2d 400, 402
(Minn. 1954) (citing 2 MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.13 (2d ed. 1953); 1
YOUNGQUIST & BLACIK, MINNESOTA RULES PRACTICE 193 (1953)).
9
Compare Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (holding that “a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”) with Franklin,
122 N.W.2d at 29 (holding that “a claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss . . . if it is
possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to
grant the relief demanded”).
10
See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
11
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
12
See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
13
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 556.
17
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
18
Id.
19
See id. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
20
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
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Twombly and its progeny represent a profound change in pleading
and Rule 12 motion jurisprudence which is impacting pleading and quite
possibly Rule 12 motion practice in Minnesota’s state courts.21 Within the
past four years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has cited Twombly twice for
the proposition that legal conclusions do not bind courts charged with
deciding whether a complaint states an actionable claim for relief.22 Yet the
Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to explain what effect, if any, Twombly’s
prohibition against pleading by legal conclusion has on the Franklin rule
which, literally read, determines pleading sufficiency based on what the
pleader ultimately might prove. 23 In Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, the
Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Franklin to uphold the validity of a
complaint alleging a counterclaim for continuing trespass, noting that the
complaints in both cases contained factual allegations sufficient to state
actionable claims under that theory. 24 In Bahr v. Capella University, the
Minnesota Supreme Court cited the Franklin rule as an accepted pleading
standard. 25 In the same paragraph it cited Hebert and Twombly for the
proposition that allegations consisting of mere legal conclusions do not state
actionable claims. 26 Yet Bahr also does not explain what effect, if any,
Hebert (and Twombly) have on the Franklin rule. 27 Bahr analyzed the
complaint at issue in terms of whether its facts stated a plausible claim
without expressly adopting Twombly’s plausibility standard.28
Consequently, these three decisions, Bahr, Hebert, and Franklin,
present a paradox that must be resolved.29 On one hand, Bahr and Hebert
essentially say that actionable claims for relief require factual substance in
order to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.30 On the
other hand, the Franklin rule, literally read, makes the viability of a claim
depend on what the plaintiff ultimately might prove, as opposed to the

21

See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80
(Minn. 2010); Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008); Lorix v.
Crompton, Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 631 n.3 (Minn. 2007).
22
See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80; Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235. The Minnesota
Supreme Court originally cited Twombly in Lorix v. Crompton, Corp., but only to observe that
the High Court “recently opined on the minimum factual allegations that must be pleaded to
support a claim of restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.” 736 N.W.2d 619,
631 n.3 (Minn. 2007).
23
N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963).
24
See Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235–36.
25
See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80 (citing Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29).
26
See id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235).
27
See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80.
28
See id. at 82–85. See also infra text accompanying notes 294–297.
29
See infra Part IV (explaining the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox and its
solution).
30
See infra Part IV.B (describing how Bahr perpetuated the paradox Hebert
created).
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quality of the facts alleged.31 This contradiction is the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin
paradox.32
The Minnesota Supreme Court needs to resolve this paradox by
formally adopting Twombly’s plausibility standard.33 Adopting that standard
raises important considerations addressed in this essay. 34 Does the
plausibility standard change the concept of notice pleading in unacceptable
ways?35 If claims for relief must allege plausible facts, how should courts
apply the plausibility standard?36 Should the plausibility standard apply to
affirmative defenses as well as claims for relief?37
As a template for addressing these considerations, it is necessary to
examine Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), its interpretation under Conley, its
transformation in Twombly, and its development and extension in Iqbal.38
This examination reveals that the plausibility standard is but a larger,
thematic trend in the way the United States Supreme Court views the
function and purpose of dispositive motions.39 Against this backdrop we will
examine how formally adopting the plausibility standard as the pleading
requirement in Minnesota state courts resolves the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin
paradox while accomplishing the over-arching purposes of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure without diminishing the flexibility that modern
pleading practice offers.40
II. HOW COURTS DEFINE A “CLAIM” FOR RELIEF
DETERMINES THE EXTENT OF A PLEADER’S OBLIGATION
UNDER RULE 8 WHEN STATING A CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Both Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 require every
“claim for relief” to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .”41 How detailed the factual
31

See infra text accompanying notes 260–264 (stating the rule set out in

Franklin).

32

See infra Part IV (explaining the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox).
See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the
Hebert-Franklin paradox).
34
See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the
Hebert-Franklin paradox).
35
See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the
Hebert-Franklin paradox).
36
See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the
Hebert-Franklin paradox).
37
See infra Part IV.D (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the
Hebert-Franklin paradox).
38
See infra Part II–III (explaining the differing interpretations of Rule
Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal).
39
See infra Part III.D (examining the plausibility standard).
40
See infra Part IV (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the
Hebert-Franklin paradox).
41
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
33
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allegations need to be depends on how one defines the word “claim.” 42
Scholars and commentators have long debated what constitutes a “claim” for
purposes of pleading.43 Twombly simply reignited that debate.44
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were supposed to simplify
pleading practice.45 The common law pleader had to state facts according to
the particular writ governing the case.46 Parties alleged facts according to
what the writ required as opposed to what the pleader actually believed to
have happened.47 Hence, common law pleading had more to do with keeping
the case in court than providing real notice about what the claim involved.48
Code pleading developed to remedy this shortcoming by requiring
claims for relief to allege the actual facts of a dispute while making pleading
short and simple. 49 The Code required pleaders to provide a statement of
“facts constituting a cause of action.”50 This requirement was supposed “to
apprise the defendants of what the plaintiff relies upon and intends to
prove.”51 Code pleading required the pleader “to set forth only the ultimate
facts, free from evidentiary facts and conclusions of law.” 52 Yet the
distinction between ultimate facts, evidentiary facts, and legal conclusions
often was unclear, differed only by degree, and rightfully earned criticism
from commentators.53 Justice William Mitchell aptly described the situation
by stating the following:
It is, of course, an elementary rule of pleading that facts, and
not mere conclusions of law, are to be pleaded. But this rule
does not limit the pleader to the statement of pure matters of
42

See infra text accompanying notes 64–65 (discussing how courts define the
word claim in a broad and narrow sense).
43
See 1848 N.Y. Field Code Laws ch. 379, § 142; JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY
KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 248 (2d ed. 1993); Walter W. Cook,
Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416–19 (1921); Bernard
C. Gavit, Legal Conclusions, 16 MINN. L. REV. 378 (1932); Clarence Morris, Law and Fact,
55 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1942); Carl C. Wheaton, Manner of Stating Cause of Action, 20
CORNELL L.Q. 185 (1935).
44
See Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 10 (2008).
45
Id.
46
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 43, at 248.
47
See id.
48
See id.
49
See id.
50
1848 N.Y. Field Code Laws Ch. 379, § 142.
51
Baker v. Habedank, 277 N.W. 925, 926 (Minn. 1938) (citing Dechter v. Nat’l
Council, 153 N.W. 742 (Minn. 1915)).
52
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 43, at 249.
53
See id. at 249 (citing CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE
PLEADING § 38 at 233–36 (2d ed. 1947); Walter W. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading
Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416–19 (1921); Bernard C. Gavit, Legal Conclusions,
16 MINN. L. REV. 378 (1932); Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1942);
Carl C. Wheaton, Manner of Stating Cause of Action, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 185 (1935)).
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fact, unmixed with any matter of law. When a pleader
alleges title to or ownership of property, or the execution of
a deed in the usual form, these are not statements of pure
fact. They are all conclusions from certain probative or
evidential facts not stated. They are in part conclusions of
law and in part statements of facts, or rather the ultimate
facts drawn from these probative or evidential facts not
stated; yet these forms are universally held to be good
pleading.54
The difficulty posed by the seemingly illusive distinction between ultimate
facts, evidentiary facts, and legal conclusions often “left claimants mired in
the same highly technical attention to detail present under the common
law.”55
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remedied this problem in the
federal courts.56 Rule 8(a)(2) merely requires every claim for relief to contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim” showing the pleader’s entitlement
to relief without prescribing a particular form for pleading.57 If a claim for
relief fails to comply with that rule, Rule 12 permits the district court to
dismiss it as one failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted.58 The
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure mirror the Federal Rules in this regard.59
In order to understand exactly what Rule 8 requires of pleaders
stating claims for relief, it is necessary to understand what the word “claim”
means. 60 Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure define the word “claim” as used in Rule 8(a)(2) or
Rule 8.01.61 The Minnesota Supreme Court has equated the word “claim”
with the phrase “cause of action” by stating: “A cause of action, often
referred to as a claim, is ‘[a] group of operative facts giving rise to one or

54

Clark v. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 9 N.W. 75, 71 (Minn. 1881).
Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modern
World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1116 (2010).
56
Simplifying the hyper-technicality of code pleading is but one problem the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remedied. Before Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act in
1933, see 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012), the Conformity Act of 1872 governed federal district
court procedure. See 17 Stat. 197; R.S. 914; 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1872). The latter legislation
“required federal courts to apply the procedural law of the forum State in nonequity cases.”
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501 (2001). Thus, to the extent
state courts disagreed about what constituted appropriate pleading under the code, that
disagreement would have carried over into the federal courts.
57
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
58
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
59
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01; MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e).
60
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
61
See FED R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 801.
55
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more bases for suing’ or ‘[the] legal theory of a lawsuit.’”62 Accordingly, one
can understand the word “claim” in both a broad and a narrow sense.63 In the
narrow sense, a “claim” refers to a group of operative facts giving rise to one
or more theories of legal liability.64 In the broad sense, a “claim” means the
legal theory alleged, such as negligence, strict liability, premises liability,
etc.65
What Rule 8 requires of pleaders stating claims for relief depends
upon whether the court understands the word “claim” in the narrow or the
broad sense.66 If the court understands the word “claim” narrowly, Rule 8
requires pleaders stating claims for relief “to allege, if only in sketchy terms,
the existence of circumstances that they had reason to believe were true and
that, if true, would entitle them to relief of some kind.” 67 It requires the
following:
[A] detailed narrative in ordinary language—one setting
forth all elements of a claim under applicable substantive
law. That is, the key would have been not that the complaint
was to be above all “short,” but that it was to be above all
“plain” and showing entitlement to relief as a matter of
law.68
Charles E. Clark, the principal architect of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, seemed to take that view when he wrote: “The prevailing idea at
the present time is that notice should be given of all the operative facts going
to make up the plaintiff’s cause of action, except, of course, those which are
presumed or may properly come from the other side.” 69 Professor James
Wm. Moore put it this way:
Perhaps it is not entirely accurate to say, as one court has
said, that “it is only necessary to state a claim in the
pleadings and not a cause of action.” While the Rules have
substituted “claim” or “claim for relief” in lieu of the older
62
Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2002) (emphasis added)
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (7th ed. 1999)).
63
See id.
64
See id.
65
See id.
66
See infra text accompanying notes 67–79 (explaining the various
interpretations court interpret the word claim).
67
FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 3.6, at 147 (4th ed. 1992).
68
Charles B. Campbell, A “Plausible” Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 9 (2008) (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets are
Hid, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1685 (1998)).
69
CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 2, at 240 (2d
ed. 1947).
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and troublesome term “cause of action,” the pleading must
still state a “cause of action” in the sense that it must show
“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is not enough to
indicate merely that the plaintiff has a grievance. Sufficient
detail must be given so that the defendant, and the court, can
obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is asserting, and can
see that there is some legal basis for recovery.70
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
observed the following:
[I]t seems to be the purpose of Rule 8 to relieve the pleader
from the niceties of the dotted i and the crossed t and the
uncertainties of distinguishing in advance between
evidentiary and ultimate facts, while still requiring, in a
practical and sensible way, that he set out sufficient factual
matter to outline the elements of his cause of action or claim,
proof of which is essential to his recovery.71
Understanding the word “claim” narrowly obligates the pleader to allege
facts with sufficient clarity and heft to allow the court and responding parties
reasonably to infer the liability theories stated from the facts alleged.72 A
claim for relief that fails to contain such factual allegations would merit
dismissal as failing to state a claim for which relief could be granted.73
Less of a pleader is required under Rule 8 when stating a claim for
relief if the court understands the word “claim” broadly.74 In that situation,
the facts alleged may not have to suggest any particular liability theory at
all.75 Even the most general statement of operative facts would suffice to
state an actionable claim for relief. 76 Legal conclusions without factual
enhancement could suffice. 77 The discovery process would determine
whether the legal theories raised ultimately were actionable.78 If discovery
failed to reveal any facts in the form of evidence that might sustain the
70
2A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.13, at 1704–05
(2d ed. 1975) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Mortensen v. Chi., Great W. Ry., 2 F.R.D. 121,
121 (S.D. Iowa 1941)).
71
Daves v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 114 F.Supp. 643, 645 (D. Haw. 1953).
72
See id.
73
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
74
See Martin v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2002) (emphasis
added) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (7th ed. 1999)).
75
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (defining “claim” in a broad
sense); N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963) (interpreting the
word “claim” broadly).
76
See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
77
See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
78
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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liability theories alleged, then summary judgment, not dismissal under Rule
12, would dispose of the claim.79
The United States Supreme Court evidently understood the word
“claim” broadly when it stated the Conley rule.80 There it held the following:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of
course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.81
The Minnesota Supreme Court evidently shared that understanding of the
word “claim” when it stated the Franklin rule, Minnesota’s counterpart to
Conley.82 There it held: “A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss
based on Rule [12.02(e)] if it is possible on any evidence which might be
produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief
demanded.” 83 The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently had the same
understanding of the word “claim” when it decided First National Bank v.
Olson, where it followed a liberal interpretation of the rule stating that “there
is no justification for dismissing a complaint for insufficiency * * * unless it
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.”84
Thus, under Conley, Franklin, and Olson, a court would not use Rule
12 to dismiss an action merely because the complaint’s factual allegations
were vague, unclear, or lacking. 85 The Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledged this point in Franklin, saying that “a motion to dismiss based
on [Rule 12(b)(6) or 12.02(e)] serves an extremely limited function.”86 About
the only way the defendant could prevail on such a motion would be to show
that the plaintiff was incapable of proving facts consistent with the facts and
theories alleged.87 A neutral set of operative facts, such as facts failing to
suggest any kind of actual wrongdoing, would never fail to state a claim
because of the possibility that discovery might uncover evidence of actual
wrongdoing consistent with the legal theories conclusively alleged.88 Thus,

79

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46.
81
Id. (emphasis added).
82
Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
83
Id. (emphasis added).
84
First Nat’l Bank of Henning v. Olson, 74 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Minn. 1955)
(emphasis added) (quoting Dennis v. Vill. of Tonka Bay, 151 F.2d 411, 412 (8th Cir. 1945)).
85
See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46; Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29; Olson, 74 N.W.2d
at 129.
86
Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
87
Id.
88
See id.
80
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under Rule 12, motions to dismiss perform a very limited role when courts
understand the word “claim” broadly.89
Interestingly, the result in Conley would have been the same whether
the High Court understood the word “claim” broadly or narrowly. 90 In
Conley, African-American railroad workers sued under the Railroad Labor
Act (“RLA”), claiming their union violated the RLA by failing to provide
them with the same protection given to white employees.91 Specifically, the
African-American workers alleged that their union failed to represent their
interests when the railroad supposedly eliminated their jobs and subsequently
filled the jobs ostensibly eliminated with white employees.92 Such operative
facts clearly infer an RLA violation, even if one understands the word
“claim” narrowly.93 Understanding the word “claim” broadly, as the High
Court did in Conley, simply means that many other claims framed with even
less factual detail could avoid a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.94
Similar observations follow from the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision in Franklin. 95 That action involved the issue of whether a
counterclaim alleging a continuing trespass stated a claim for which relief
could be granted.96 It determined that the counterclaim stated an actionable
trespass claim, not because the pleader characterized the claim as one for
continuing trespass, but because the pleader had alleged facts sufficient to
permit the district court and the parties to infer that a continuing trespass had
occurred.97 Like the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Conley, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Franklin articulated a rule governing the
sufficiency of pleadings and Rule 12 motion practice that was broader than
necessary to accomplish the result in each case, essentially because each
Court understood the word “claim” as used in Rule 8 broadly.98
Why these Courts took the broad view of the word “claim” is a
mystery. 99 In Conley, neither the briefing nor the oral arguments focused
heavily on the Rule 8 pleading requirements. 100 Nothing in the Franklin
opinion indicated that the parties had any fundamental disagreement about
89

See id.
See infra text accompanying notes 91–93 (explaining how interpreting the
word claim differently would not have changed the result in Conley).
91
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42–43 (1957).
92
See id.
93
See id.
94
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
95
See N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn. 1963).
96
See id.
97
See id. at 30–31.
98
See id.; Conley, 355 U.S. at 46–48.
99
The courts did not offer an explanation as to why they interpreted “claim”
broadly.
100
See Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and Conley
v. Gibson, 52 HOW. L.J. 73, 89–92 (2008) (discussing the parties’ briefs and oral arguments in
Conley).
90
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what Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 required of pleaders. 101 This mystery is, and
perhaps always shall remain, a curiosity for historians and legal scholars.
III. THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD REPRESENTS A SHIFT
FROM THE BROAD TO THE NARROW DEFINITION OF A
“CLAIM” FOR RELIEF, MAKING RULE 12 MOTIONS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE
Conley’s “no set of facts” rule guaranteed that for the next fifty years
courts and lawyers understood the word “claim” as used in Rule 8 broadly
and the concept of notice pleading as liberally permitting claims for relief to
provide notice of the claim in only the most general terms.102 As a result,
courts and lawyers generally paid little attention to the factual substance
underlying claims for relief.103 That state of affairs changed abruptly when
the Supreme Court of the United States decided Twombly in 2007, holding
that claims needed to be substantively (as well as formally) sufficient by
alleging facts giving rise to a plausible claim for relief.104 Two years later the
High Court decided Iqbal, emphasizing that Twombly’s plausibility standard
applied to claims for relief in all civil actions.105 Both of these landmark
decisions show that the plausibility standard rests on the narrow definition of
the word “claim.”106
A. Twombly Changed Federal Pleading Practice by Imposing a
Substantive Notice Requirement on Pleading.
Twombly involved a putative class action lawsuit alleging a violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.107 That provision forbids the formation
of a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce.”108 The plaintiffs were consumers of telecommunication services
who alleged that incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”) engaged in
parallel conduct whereby they agreed not to compete with one another.109
This conduct allegedly had the effect of preventing competition by
competing local exchange carriers (“CLECs”). 110 But the complaint never
actually alleged facts suggesting that the ILECs actually formed a contract,
101

See Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 28.
See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Conley became binding precedent for other courts to follow. The Twombly decision abruptly
changed the pleading standard in 2007.
103
See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (stating the “no set of facts” rule).
104
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007).
105
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–81 (2009).
106
See id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63.
107
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548.
108
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004)).
109
Id. at 551.
110
Id.
102
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combination, or conspiracy to restrain trade by refusing to compete in one
another’s markets as CLECs.111
The district court dismissed the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) because “the behavior of each ILEC in resisting the incursion of
CLECs is fully explained by the ILEC’s own interests in defending its
individual territory.”112 It determined that the complaint failed to raise the
inference that the ILECs’ acts resulted from a conspiracy because the
plaintiffs failed to allege facts which suggested that such conduct was
contrary to the ILECs’ apparent economic interest.113
The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district court used the
wrong standard to test the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ complaint.114
Although it acknowledged that the plaintiffs had to plead facts which
“include conspiracy among the realm of ‘plausible’ possibilities in order to
survive a motion to dismiss,” the Second Circuit ruled that “a court would
have to conclude that there is no set of facts that would permit a plaintiff to
demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the product of
collusion rather than coincidence” in order “to rule that allegations of parallel
anticompetitive conduct fail to support a plausible conspiracy claim.”115
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit,
holding that a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”116 Justice Souter, writing for the majority, noted
that parallel business behavior or even conscious parallelism is not unlawful
and does not establish a conspiracy to restrain trade.117 Evidence indicative
of nothing more than parallel conduct would not entitle a plaintiff alleging a
Sherman Act violation to a directed verdict.118 Nor would such evidence be
legally sufficient to avoid summary judgment by ruling out the possibility
that the defendants were acting independently as opposed to being involved
in a contract, combination, or conspiracy to restrain trade.119
From this, the Court reasoned, it followed that a complaint alleging a
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act had to allege more than parallel
conduct to state a claim for which relief could be granted.120 Under Rule
8(a)(2) the complaint not only must amount to a short and plain statement of
the claim, its factual allegations also must provide the grounds, or basis, for
the pleader’s entitlement to relief. 121 The complaint must do more than
provide mere labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the cause of
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 552.
Id.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id. at 570.
See id. at 553–54.
Id. at 554.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554.
See id. at 554–57.
Id. at 555.
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action’s elements.122 Its factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true . . . .”123 The pleader’s entitlement to
relief must be facially plausible, meaning that, within the context of a
Sherman Antitrust claim, the complaint must contain “enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”124
In imposing factual plausibility as a pleading requirement under Rule
8, the Court emphasized that “[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it
simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of [an] illegal agreement.”125 Whether a plaintiff can
actually prove the existence of such an agreement is immaterial to deciding
whether the complaint states a plausible set of facts. 126 The plausibility
standard, held the Court, requires the pleader to allege facts suggestive of,
not conduct merely consistent with, unlawful activity.127
The Court’s imposition of this plausibility standard on pleading
clearly was motivated in large part by the expense of discovery in antitrust
cases.128 The Court quoted its decision in Associated General Contractors of
California, Inc. v. Carpenters, noting that “a district court must retain the
power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.” 129 That consideration
was particularly strong in Twombly, where the “plaintiffs represent[ed] a
putative class of at least 90 percent of all subscribers to local telephone or
high-speed Internet service in the continental United States, in an action
against America’s largest telecommunications firms . . . .”130
Yet Twombly’s plausibility standard appears motivated by more than
simply the desire to conserve costs. 131 The High Court viewed the
plausibility standard as essential to a court’s ability to control the course and
scope of litigation effectively.132 Justice Souter wrote:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early
in the discovery process through “careful case
122

Id.
Id. (citing 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§1216, at 235–36 (3d ed. 2004)).
124
Id. at 556.
125
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
126
See id.
127
Id. at 557.
128
See id. at 558.
129
Id. (quoting Ass’n Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
528 n. 17 (1983)).
130
Id. at 559
131
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
132
See id.
123
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management,” given the common lament that the success of
judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on
the modest side. And it is self-evident that the problem of
discovery abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of
evidence at the summary judgment stage,” much less “lucid
instructions to juries,” the threat of discovery expense will
push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases
before reaching those proceedings.133
Hence, the plausibility standard recognizes, especially in large and
complicated cases, the need for pleadings to define the issues so that judges
and lawyers can perform their jobs effectively and efficiently.134
After imposing the plausibility standard, the High Court observed
that “a good many judges and commentators have balked at taking the literal
terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard.”135 It then retired the “no
set of facts rule,” stating that “[t]he phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent
with the allegations in the complaint.”136 Twombly held that the Conley rule
actually “described the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate
complaint claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern
a complaint’s survival.”137
Thus, Twombly understands the term “claim” narrowly and is a
landmark decision for at least three reasons.138 First, it requires pleaders to
support claims for relief with factual substance in addition to providing
formal notice of the legal theories advanced.139 Second, it requires pleaders
to do more than state legal conclusions or recite a claim’s elements by
alleging facts, taken as true, which plausibly suggest wrongdoing under one
or more legal theories.140 Third, claims failing to allege plausible facts are
subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), thereby enabling courts to
control discovery costs, particularly in large, class-action cases.141

133

Id. at 559 (citations omitted).
See id.
135
Id. at 562 (citations omitted).
136
Id. at 563.
137
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
138
See infra text accompanying notes 139–141 (stating the three reasons that make
Twombly a landmark case).
139
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
140
See id. at 556.
141
See id. at 555–58.
134
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B. Twombly Raised Interesting Issues While Transforming the Landscape
of Federal Pleading Practice.
Although Twombly transformed the landscape of federal pleading
practice by construing the word “claim” as used in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
narrowly, it also raised some interesting questions.142 Did Twombly signal a
return to code pleading? 143 The High Court evidently did not think so. 144
During the very same term it also decided Erickson v. Pardus.145 That case
involved a pro se inmate’s § 1983 claim alleging that Colorado state prison
officials violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment when they commenced, then wrongfully terminated,
medical treatment for hepatitis C.146 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit deemed these allegations “conclusory” under Twombly and
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Erickson’s complaint. 147 The
Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, noting that Rule 8(a)(2) merely
requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader’s
entitlement to relief and that the pleading of specific facts is unnecessary.148
The complaint alleged that a prison doctor’s decision to remove Erickson
from prescribed hepatitis C medication was endangering his life. 149 “This
alone,” held the Court, “was enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2).”150
Does Twombly’s plausibility standard apply to claims for relief made
by pro se parties? 151 In Erickson the High Court observed that pro se
complaints, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 152 It also quoted
Twombly and Conley, saying that Rule 8(a)(2) requires the pleader to “give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.”153 Although the High Court does not say it expressly in Erickson,
“fair notice” in the post-Twombly world requires the complaint to contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”154 It
logically follows that a pro se complaint also must comply with Twombly’s
plausibility standard, even though federal courts will apply the standard to
pro se parties deferentially.155
142

Id.
See id.
144
See id.; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
145
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (per curiam).
146
Id. at 89–90.
147
Id. at 90.
148
Id. at 93.
149
Id. at 94.
150
Id.
151
See infra text accompanying notes 152–155 (explaining why the Twombly
standard applies to pro se parties).
152
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
153
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
154
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (1955).
155
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
143
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After Twombly, it was unclear whether the plausibility standard
would apply to all civil cases, just complex cases involving burdensome
discovery, or just antitrust cases.156 Also unclear was the degree to which the
plausibility standard affected a pleader’s obligation under Rule 8(a)(2). 157
The United States Supreme Court addressed these questions directly and
indirectly two years later in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.158
C. Iqbal Addressed the Issues Twombly Raised by Applying the
Plausibility Standard to All Civil Cases in Federal Court.
Iqbal arose from a Bivens action against numerous federal officials,
including John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the United States,
and Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”).159 Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani citizen, claimed the government
deprived him of various constitutional protections afforded by the First and
Fifth Amendments during his detention as a person of high interest under
harsh conditions at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn following
the September 11 terrorist attacks.160 He alleged that the FBI arrested and
detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation into
those attacks during the ensuing months.161 The complaint alleged that many
of those men, including Iqbal, were designated as persons of high interest
solely because of their race, religion, and national origin.162 According to the
complaint, Ashcroft and Mueller approved a policy of holding these
detainees in highly restrictive conditions until the FBI cleared them of
involvement in terrorism.163 Iqbal claimed that prison staff subjected him to
inhumane living conditions, failed to provide him with adequate food,
brutally beat him on two occasions, denied him medical care, and subjected
him to daily strip and body-cavity searches.164 He also claimed that prison
staff interfered with his prayers, confiscated his Koran, and refused to allow
him to attend Friday prayer services.165
The defendants filed motions to dismiss on a variety of grounds,
including qualified immunity. 166 Their qualified immunity arguments fell
into four broad categories: (1) the plaintiffs failed to allege violations of a
clearly established right, (2) the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient personal
156

See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
See id.
158
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
159
See Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21434,
at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
160
See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147–49 (2d Cir. 2007).
161
Id. at 148.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 148–49.
165
Id. at 149.
166
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 150.
157
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involvement by the defendants in the challenged actions, (3) the plaintiffs’
allegations were too conclusory to overcome a qualified immunity defense,
and (4) the defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable.167 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied most of the
motions to dismiss, including those made on qualified immunity grounds.168
The defendants appealed from that decision on an interlocutory basis.169
On appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the parties disputed the extent to which a plaintiff must plead
specific facts to overcome a qualified immunity defense at the motion-todismiss stage.170 After discussing four Supreme Court cases it characterized
as providing “not readily harmonized” guidance, 171 the Second Circuit
observed that Twombly created “[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the
standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings . . . .”172 It noted that some
statements in Twombly suggested that a new and heightened pleading
standard be applied universally while other statements suggested that
Twombly’s holding had a more limited application.173 Ultimately, the Second
Circuit determined that Twombly did not require a universal, heightened
pleading standard but “a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obligates a
pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts
where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”174 After
conducting a detailed analysis of Iqbal’s various claims under this “flexible”
standard, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the
defendants’ motions to dismiss with limited exception. 175 In a separate
concurring opinion, the Honorable Jose A. Cabranes invited the Supreme
Court at the earliest opportunity to reconsider some of its “less than crystal
clear” precedent concerning pleading.176
The High Court accepted that invitation by accepting review of the
case and using it as an opportunity to reverse the Second Circuit.177 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that a Bivens action within the
context of First and Fifth Amendment violations requires a plaintiff to plead
and prove that the defendant acted with a discriminatory purpose. 178 The
Court noted that such purposeful discrimination “requires more than ‘intent

167

Id. at 151.
See id. at 151–52.
169
Id. at 147.
170
Id. at 153.
171
Id. at 153–54.
172
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 155.
173
See id. at 155–57.
174
Id. at 157–58.
175
Id. at 177–78.
176
See id. at 178–79.
177
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009).
178
Id. at 676 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
540–41 (1993); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)).
168
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as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.’”179 Rather, it requires
pleading and proof that an official took “a course of action ‘because of’, not
merely ‘in spite of’, [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.180 The Court reasoned that,
to state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established
right, [Iqbal had to] plead sufficient factual matter to show
that [officials] adopted and implemented the detention
policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for
the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or
national origin.181
Turning to Iqbal’s complaint, the Court observed that Twombly
required courts to employ a “two-pronged approach” when deciding whether
a complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.182 First,
although courts must accept as true all facts alleged, legal conclusions are not
entitled to the presumption of truth. 183 Legal conclusions include
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which Twombly
referred to as “legal conclusion couched as a factional allegation.”184 Second,
the pleaded facts must permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct. 185 Although the determination of whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task
requiring a court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense, the
facts alleged must show the pleader is entitled to the relief sought.186
The Court then demonstrated how this two-pronged approach
operated when applied to Iqbal’s complaint.187 It began by identifying and
isolating the allegations that amounted to mere legal conclusions. 188 The
Court observed:
Respondent pleads that petitioners “knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]” to harsh
conditions of confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for
no legitimate penological interest.” The complaint alleges
that Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of this invidious

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. (citing Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
Id. at 676–77 (alteration in original) (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279).
Id. at 677.
See id. at 679.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (1955)).
Id. at 678–79.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680–84.
Id. at 680–81.
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policy, and that Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting and
executing it.189
The Court went on to hold that “[t]hese bare assertions amount to nothing
more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional
discrimination claim . . . .” because they merely accused federal officials of
adopting a policy because of its discriminatory effect upon an identifiable
group of people.190
Having identified and isolated the complaint’s conclusory
allegations, the Court next considered whether the remaining factual
allegations stated a plausible claim for relief.191 What remained were Iqbal’s
allegations that FBI Director Mueller directed, and Attorney General
Ashcroft approved the arrest and detention of thousands of Arab Muslim
men as part of the government’s September 11 investigation and that
authorities held these detainees in highly restrictive conditions until cleared
of wrongdoing. 192 The Court held that, although these allegations were
consistent with a claim for purposeful discrimination, they did not plausibly
establish that government officials acted with such a purpose.193 Given the
fact that nineteen Arab Muslim hijackers perpetrated the September 11
attacks, the Court reasoned that “[i]t should come as no surprise that a
legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate,
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy
was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”194 It was just as likely, said the
Court, that Ashcroft and Mueller oversaw a policy that was both lawful and
justified by arresting and detaining persons having potential connections to
the September 11 terrorists.195
The Court further noted that Iqbal would not be entitled to relief
even if one could plausibly infer from the alleged facts that unconstitutional
discrimination led to his arrest. 196 The complaint did not challenge the
constitutionality of Iqbal’s arrest or detention in the MDC.197 Iqbal claimed
that government officials violated his constitutional rights by implementing a
policy of holding him and other “high interest” detainees. 198 Yet the
complaint contained no factual allegations showing that government officials
purposefully housed detainees due to their race, religion, and national

189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 681 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (1955)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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origin. 199 “All it plausibly suggest[ed] [was] that the Nation’s top law
enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought
to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the
suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.”200 The Court held that, under
these circumstances, the complaint did not comply with Rule 8 because the
facts alleged failed to comply with the requirement that a pleader state facts
showing entitlement to relief.201
Iqbal not only applies Twombly to Bivens actions involving qualified
immunity defenses, it is a landmark decision in its own right for at least three
reasons. 202 First, Iqbal rejected the argument that Twombly is limited to
pleadings involving antitrust claims. 203 The High Court emphasized that
Twombly “was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8.”204 As
such, Twombly “governs the pleading standard ‘in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts.’”205 Because the plausibility
standard applies universally to all claims for relief within federal civil
litigation, one can fairly infer that Twombly does not apply only to complex
cases where the anticipated discovery costs are high. After Iqbal, lower
courts also held that the plausibility standard applies even to pro se parties,
although their pleadings receive more deferential treatment than those
drafted by lawyers.206
Second, Iqbal reemphasizes that motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim do not turn on what facts the claimant might uncover through
discovery. 207 This statement is especially true in the qualified immunity
context, where the doctrine’s basic thrust “is to free officials from the
concerns of litigation, including ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery.’” 208
Nevertheless, no claim deficient under Rule 8 is entitled to reach the
discovery phase.209
Third, although Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permits pleaders to allege some matters generally, such as discriminatory
intent, it “does not give him license to evade the less rigid — though still
199

Id.
Id. at 683.
201
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683.
202
Id. at 684; See also infra text accompanying notes 203–211 (stating why Iqbal
is a landmark decision).
203
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684.
204
Id.
205
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
206
See, e.g., Ventura-Vera v. Dewitt, No. 11-1130, 417 Fed.Appx. 591, 592 (8th
Cir. June 7, 2011) (per curiam); Williams v. Dept. of Corr., No. 11 Civ. 1515 (SAS), 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100803, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2011); Smith v. Virginia, No. 3:08cv800,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60828, at *6 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2009) (citing Giarratano v. Johnson,
521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008); Thigpen v. McDonnell, No. 06-7719, 273 Fed.Appx.
271, 273 (4th Cir. 2008)).
207
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684–85.
208
Id. at 685 (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991)).
209
Id. at 685–86.
200
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operative — strictures of Rule 8.”210 Because Rule 8 requires a pleader to
allege facts showing entitlement to relief, it does not follow that the pleader
may simply “plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label
‘general allegation,’ and expect his complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss.”211 The pleading must allege sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, showing the pleader’s entitlement to the relief sought.212 The fact that
one may plead certain matters in general terms does not absolve the pleader
of the need to allege facts suggestive of wrongdoing in accordance with the
theories alleged.213
D. By Understanding a “Claim” for Relief Narrowly, the Plausibility
Standard Makes Rule 12 Motions an Integral Part of Federal Civil
Procedure.
The plausibility standard has altered the landscape of federal
pleading practice by changing the understanding of a “claim” for relief under
Rule 8.214 Twombly’s retirement of Conley’s “no set of facts” rule shows that
federal courts now view a “claim” for relief narrowly.215 Hence, in federal
court, a complaint consisting of conclusory statements married to legal
theories will not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.216
Stating an actionable claim for relief in federal court now requires the
pleader to state operative facts suggesting one or more legal theories.217
Yet the plausibility standard really is part of a larger shift in the way
federal courts view dispositive motion practice.218 That shift began in 1986,
when the Supreme Court of the United States decided the Celotex trilogy,
which altered the way lower courts viewed summary judgment as a means
for disposing of litigation.219 In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the United States
Supreme Court made the following observation about summary judgment
procedure under the federal rules:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have for almost 50
years authorized motions for summary judgment upon
proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of
material fact. Summary judgment procedure is properly
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather
210

Id. at 686–87.
Id. at 687.
212
See id.
213
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687–88.
214
Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–63 (2007) with
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
215
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561–63.
216
See id. at 555–56; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
217
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.
218
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327–28 (1986).
219
Id.
211
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as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed “to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action.”220
According to Celotex, federal district courts should have no inherent
predisposition against summary judgment motions. 221 Summary judgment
procedure simply is a mechanism allowing the district courts to dismiss cases
without a trial when the undisputed material facts adduced through discovery
fail to support one or more essential elements of a claim for relief.222
The plausibility standard now allows one to make a similar point
about dispositive motion practice challenging the legal sufficiency of
pleadings to state claims.223 For over fifty years the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have authorized motions for judgment on the pleadings upon a
proper showing that the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can
be granted.224 That circumstance exists when the complaint fails to contain
sufficient factual matter, taken as true, stating a plausible claim for relief.225
When evaluating a pleading’s sufficiency to state a claim, the court’s focus is
not on whether the pleader ultimately can establish liability under the legal
theories alleged.226 Nor does the court’s determination necessarily hinge on
the number and detail of facts alleged.227 Rather, the inquiry is whether the
factual matter alleged is legally sufficient to suggest wrongdoing consistent
with the stated legal theories. 228 The plausibility standard ensures that
motions challenging the legal sufficiency of pleadings to state claims also are
properly regarded, not as disfavored procedural shortcuts, but rather as
integral parts of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed “to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”229
Thus, the plausibility standard lends a thematic harmony to the
manner in which federal courts interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in the area of dispositive motion practice.230 Summary judgment procedure
under Rule 56(c) challenges the non-moving party’s entitlement to a trial by
testing the legal sufficiency of the non-moving party’s evidence to establish
the essential elements of the claim. 231 A party lacking evidence legally
220
221
222
223

12(c).

Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
See id.
See id.
Here we have in mind motions made pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and

224

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c).
226
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
227
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
228
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
229
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
230
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); infra
text accompanying notes 231–234.
231
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
225
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sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact is not entitled to a trial of
the claim. 232 Dispositive motion practice under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c)
challenges a pleader’s entitlement to discovery by testing the legal
sufficiency of factual allegations to state a plausible claim for relief.233 Just
as a lack of admissible evidence relative to a claim’s essential elements
entitles the moving party to summary judgment, the lack of legally sufficient
factual matter indicative of a claim’s essential elements entitles the moving
party to dismissal for failure to state a claim.234 Therefore, the plausibility
standard, properly understood and applied, yields results consistent with the
overall purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.235
IV. THE BAHR-HEBERT-FRANKLIN PARADOX IS AN
UNNECESSARY PROBLEM THAT THE PLAUSIBILITY
STANDARD CAN SOLVE IF PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD AND
APPLIED
The Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox exists because the pleading rules
stated in those cases test the sufficiency of pleadings under conflicting
standards.236 Like the Conley rule, the Franklin rule, literally read, makes a
complaint’s sufficiency to state a claim depend upon what the plaintiff might
be able to prove, something that only the discovery process can determine.237
The prohibition against pleading by legal conclusion, as stated in Bahr and
Hebert, makes the complaint’s success or failure depend on the legal
sufficiency of the facts alleged.238 Twombly’s plausibility standard solves the
paradox acceptably, provided that lawyers and judges properly understand,
use, and apply it in a practical way that effectuates the purpose of modern
civil procedure related to pleading standards.239
A. Hebert Created a Paradox in Minnesota’s Pleading and Rule 12.02(e)
Jurisprudence by Tacitly Applying the Plausibility Standard Without
Discussing Its Impact on the Franklin Rule
The Minnesota Supreme Court first cited Twombly in Hebert, a
declaratory judgment action wherein landowners sought equitable relief in
the form of ejectment and trespass damages against the City of Fifty
232

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).
234
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).
235
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
236
See infra Part IV.A; see infra Part IV.B; see infra Part IV.C (discussing the
Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox).
237
N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963).
238
See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010); Hebert v. City of
Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 2008).
239
See infra Part IV.C (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the BahrHebert-Franklin paradox).
233
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Lakes.240 The landowners alleged that the City constructed a gravel road in
1971 that deviated from the sixty-six foot wide area dedicated as a public
roadway on plat drawings recorded in 1954.241 They alleged that the City
refused to remove the road from their property despite their demands.242 The
complaint did not allege when the landowners demanded the City remove the
road.243 Nevertheless, the landowners characterized the road construction as a
“continuing trespass.” 244 The City moved to dismiss the landowners’
complaint pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim
for which relief could be granted. 245 The district court granted the City’s
motion. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and an appeal to the
Minnesota Supreme Court followed.246
After stating the case’s facts, the Minnesota Supreme Court
discussed the standard of review applicable to motions for dismissal for
failure to state a claim.247 It articulated that standard without even invoking
the Franklin rule, stating the following:
When reviewing a case dismissed pursuant to Minn. R. Civ.
P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, the question before this court is whether the
complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Our
review is de novo. We are to “consider only the facts alleged
in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must
construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party,” the landowners in this case.248
In articulating the applicable standard of review, the court focused entirely
on the legal sufficiency of the factual matter alleged, not the landowners’
ultimate ability to prove their claims with evidence adduced through the
discovery process. 249 This approach to Rule 12 motion practice subtly
resembles Twombly, even though the court did not invoke Twombly when
discussing the standard of review.250

240

Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Minn. 2008).
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
See id. at 233–34.
245
Id. at 228–29.
246
Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 228.
247
Id. at 229.
248
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Bodah v. Lakeville Motor
Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003)).
249
See id.
250
Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) with
Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 228.
241
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Hebert’s subtle resemblance to Twombly does not end with the
standard of review.251 The court analyzed the landowners’ trespass claim in a
manner that accords with Twombly. 252 It observed that whether the
landowners’ trespass claim survived dismissal under Rule 12.02(e) depended
upon the character of the trespass alleged. 253 If the landowners alleged a
permanent trespass, one stemming from the City’s 1971 road construction,
then the six-year statute of limitations would bar the landowners’ claim.254 If,
on the other hand, the landowners alleged a continuing trespass, a recurring
intrusion onto their property, then the six-year statute of limitations could not
bar the claim as a matter of law. 255 The court looked only to the factual
matter alleged in order to determine the true character of the trespass
alleged.256 Citing a decision from the Third Circuit and Twombly, the court
acknowledged: “We are not bound by legal conclusions stated in a complaint
when determining whether the complaint survives a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.” 257 With this acknowledgment in mind, the court
decided that the landowners alleged a continuing trespass, not because they
characterized the trespass as such, but because the landowners had alleged
that they unsuccessfully demanded that the City remove the road.258 Then,
quoting Franklin, the court observed that the landowners’ allegation of an
unsuccessful demand for removal of the road was legally sufficient to state a
claim for continuing trespass because it signaled that “the landowner[s]
‘consent[ed] to an entry upon the land’ and because of that consent, ‘the
failure to remove the structures, rather than the original entry, characterize[d]
the wrong and support[ed] [a] theory of continuing trespass.’” 259
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided that the six-year statute
of limitations did not bar the landowners’ continuing trespass claim based on
the alleged facts.260
Despite its very Twombly-like legal analysis and its antecedent
standard of review, Hebert never clarified, corrected, or explained the
Franklin rule as the Supreme Court of the United States clarified, corrected,
and explained the Conley rule.261 This omission is puzzling, given the court’s
heavy reliance on Franklin’s rationale.262 Although the Franklin rule literally
251

See Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 233–36.
See id.
253
See id. at 233–34.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
See id. at 234–35.
257
Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235 (citing Anspach v. City of Philadelphia, 503 F.3d
256, 260 (3d Cir. 2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007)).
258
See id. at 235–36.
259
Id. at 236 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting N. States Power
Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Minn. 1963)).
260
See id. at 236.
261
Compare Twombly, 550 U.S. at 543 with Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 226.
262
See Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 236.
252
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states that “[a] claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss based on Rule
[12.02(e)] if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced,
consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded,” 263 its
disposition, as noted above, did not turn on the plaintiff’s characterization of
the alleged wrong as a continuing trespass subject to evidence adduced in
discovery. Rather, it turned on the factual matter the plaintiff had alleged,
namely that she had unsuccessfully demanded removal of NSP’s
transmission line towers, signaling that the alleged wrongdoing involved
NSP’s continual refusal to terminate the trespass, not its construction of the
transmission line towers. 264 It, therefore, is strange that the Minnesota
Supreme Court did not borrow from Twombly to explain the Franklin rule as
“describ[ing] the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint
claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a
complaint’s survival.”265
In Hebert, the Minnesota Supreme Court essentially applied
Twombly’s plausibility standard without expressly adopting that standard for
pleading in Minnesota’s state courts.266 Franklin itself analyzed a trespass
claim’s survival on a motion to dismiss based on the factual matter alleged as
opposed to the mere legal conclusions assigned to the facts. 267 Yet the
Franklin rule, read literally, permits a claim to survive a motion to dismiss
even if premised on mere legal conclusions.268 Franklin also discussed how
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure liberalized pleading by citing First
National Bank v. Olson, a case explaining that those rules had abolished the
distinction between facts and legal conclusions and permitted pleading by
way of broad conclusions rather than ultimate facts.269 Thus, Hebert presents
a paradox because it applies a pleading standard at odds with the letter of the
Franklin rule and the traditional, liberal understanding of notice pleading
under the rules.270
B. Bahr Perpetuated the Paradox Hebert Created in Minnesota’s Pleading
and Rule 12.02(e) Jurisprudence.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Bahr merely
perpetuated the paradox Hebert started. 271 Bahr involved a claim for
retaliation discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act

263
264
265
266
267
268
269

Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
See id. at 30.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
See Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 235–36.
See Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 30–31.
See id. at 29–31.
See id. at 29 n.2; First Nat’l Bank of Henning v. Olson, 74 N.W.2d 123, 129

(Minn. 1955).
270
271

Compare Hebert, 744 N.W.2d at 228 with Franklin, 122 N.W.2d at 29.
See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 2010).
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(“MHRA”). 272 Elen Bahr, a Caucasian woman, worked in Capella’s
communications department and supervised L.A., an African-American
employee.273 Bahr claimed that she was the victim of reprisal discrimination
because she opposed Capella’s treatment of L.A., specifically the decision
not to place L.A. on a formal performance improvement plan (“PIP”), which
Bahr viewed as discriminatory to L.A. and other employees.274 The district
court held that Bahr’s complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could
be granted because Capella’s decision not to place L.A. on a PIP did not
amount to an adverse employment action.275 The district court never reached
the issue of whether Bahr had adequately pled a good faith, reasonable belief
that Capella discriminated against L.A. by not placing her on a PIP.276
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Bahr’s
complaint survived dismissal because she adequately alleged her own good
faith, reasonable belief that Capella’s actions, which she opposed, violated
the MHRA.277 The court of appeals noted that Bahr had alleged that Capella
refused to implement a PIP for L.A. four times in an effort to help her
improve her job performance despite allowing her to initiate PIPs for other
employees. 278 The court also observed that Bahr alleged that Capella’s
human resources department commented that L.A. had a racially-biased
history with Capella and that it was concerned that initiating a PIP would
prompt a lawsuit. 279 For these reasons, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
concluded that Bahr adequately alleged objectively reasonable grounds
supporting her subjective belief that Capella treated L.A. differently because
of her race in violation of the MHRA.280
With regard to the applicable pleading standard, however, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals viewed Twombly as having corrected the
Franklin rule. 281 After reciting the Franklin rule, the court of appeals
emphatically stated:
[W]e are mindful that the United States Supreme Court has
recently corrected this standard insofar as it suggests that the
future introduction of evidence can substitute for an
adequate statement of facts in the complaint; the statement
of entitlement to relief must go beyond “labels and
conclusions” or the “speculative” presentation of a claim.282
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282

Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 80.
Id.
Id.; Bahr v. Capella Univ., 765 N.W.2d 428, 438–39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
Bahr, 765 N.W.2d at 437.
Id.
See id. at 439.
Id. at 436–37.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Minnesota Court of Appeals expressed the view that current pleading
jurisprudence “demands that the complaint state ‘enough factual matter’ . . .
to suggest, short of ‘probability,’ ‘plausible grounds’ for a claim—a pleading
with ‘enough heft’ to show entitlement.”283 This statement virtually invited
the Minnesota Supreme Court to adopt Twombly’s plausibility standard.284
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted review, it did not
accept the invitation to formally adopt the plausibility standard as
Minnesota’s rule for pleading and deciding Rule 12.02(e) motions. 285 It
reversed the court of appeals without commenting on whether it correctly
interpreted Minnesota’s pleading and Rule 12 jurisprudence in light of
Twombly.286 After setting forth the case’s facts and procedural background,
the court recited the standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim in a way that illustrates the paradox Hebert created:
We have said that “a pleading will be dismissed only if it
appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be
introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would
support granting the relief demanded.” N. States Power Co.
v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 395, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (1963).
But a legal conclusion in the complaint is not binding on us.
Herbert, 744 N.W.2d at 235. A plaintiff must provide more
than labels and conclusions. See id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007)).287
This recitation of the standard for reviewing a Rule 12.02(e) motion
illustrates just how paradoxical Minnesota’s pleading jurisprudence has
become. 288 Literally read, the Franklin rule makes the success of a Rule
12.02(e) motion depend on the potential existence of facts ultimately proven
as opposed to the legal sufficiency of the facts actually alleged.289 Hebert
says that pleading by legal conclusion fails to state an actionable claim for
relief, and Twombly holds that a complaint consisting of nothing more than
labels and conclusions will not suffice. 290 Clearly Hebert and Twombly
conflict with a literal understanding of the Franklin rule, resulting in a

283

Id. at 437 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007)).
See Bahr, 765 N.W.2d at 437.
285
See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 83–85 (Minn. 2010).
286
See id.
287
Id. at 80.
288
See id.
289
See N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963).
290
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Hebert v. City of
Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Minn. 2008).
284

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2013

29

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 36 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 5

466

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:3

paradox.291 Unfortunately, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not address this
paradox in Bahr when discussing the standard of review.292
As it did in Hebert, the Minnesota Supreme Court then engaged in a
Twombly-like analysis of Bahr’s complaint.293 The court said the following:
Bahr alleges that she opposed “discriminatory employment
practices.” But Bahr’s complaint indicates that there was
ongoing communication between Bahr and Capella
concerning L.A.’s performance issues. Bahr wanted to put
L.A. on a formal PIP; Human Resources disagreed,
instructed Bahr not to implement a formal PIP, and indicated
that L.A. had a “history” at Capella that was racially based
and Capella was concerned that L.A. might file a
discrimination lawsuit. The complaint states that Bahr told
employees in Human Resources on four occasions that she
believed Capella’s treatment of L.A. was unfair and
discriminatory to L.A. and to other employees. On two
occasions, Bahr stated that she was unwilling to engage in
what she believed to be discriminatory treatment. Although
the complaint makes vague references that Capella somehow
discriminated against employees other than L.A., the
underlying actions were only with respect to L.A. Bahr
appears to allege that Capella discriminated against L.A.
because Bahr was not allowed to put L.A. on a formal PIP
and L.A.’s performance issues were handled differently
because of L.A.’s race.294
The court then noted that Capella did not contest whether Bahr acted in good
faith but whether it was objectively reasonable for Bahr to believe Capella’s
decision not to place L.A. on a PIP violated the MHRA.295 “Accordingly,”
said the court, “the issue here concerns the objective component—was
Bahr’s opposition based on a legal theory and facts that are plausible?”296
The court ultimately reversed the court of appeals, determining that “no
reasonable person could believe that Capella’s treatment of L.A. was
forbidden by the MHRA because L.A. was not subjected to anything that
could remotely be considered an adverse employment action.”297 Clearly, the
Minnesota Supreme Court employed the plausibility standard when deciding
291

See supra text accompanying notes 289–290 (discussing how the rulings in
Hebert, Twombly, and Franklin create a paradox).
292
Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 80–85.
293
Id. at 82.
294
Id.
295
Id.
296
Id. (emphasis added).
297
Id. at 84–85.
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whether Bahr stated a legally sufficient claim for reprisal discrimination
under the MHRA.298
As in Hebert, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bahr essentially
applied the plausibility standard to determine whether the complaint stated a
claim for which relief could be granted.299 In Bahr, however, the court was
blunt about what it was doing. Bahr implies but does not hold that Minnesota
courts should use Twombly’s plausibility standard to judge the legal
sufficiency of pleadings to state claims for relief.300 Unfortunately, Bahr does
not repudiate a literal reading of the Franklin rule, nor does it explain how
the Franklin rule, phrased in terms of the pleader’s ability to produce
evidence, can continue as a viable interpretation of Rule 8.01 in light of
Hebert and Bahr.301
C. The Plausibility Standard, Properly Understood and Applied,
Acceptably Solves the Paradox, Thereby Advancing the Purpose Behind
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure serve a virtual trinity of
objectives. 302 According to Rule 1, the Rules “shall be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action.” 303 This requirement applies to procedural rules involving
pleading and motions to dismiss no less than other procedural rules. 304
Minnesota State courts should require a pleading standard that is neither too
complicated for effective use by claimants nor so formalistic that it fosters
abuse by defendants who use it to play a game of technicalities.305 Pleading a
legally sufficient claim for relief should not require rocket science, especially
in big cases involving astronomical numbers of relevant details.306 Moreover,
it is impossible to require a claimant to know every last detail supporting a
claim before commencing an action, and imposing such a requirement
“improperly den[ies] the plaintiff the opportunity to prove [the] claim.”307
298

See Bahr, 788 N.W.2d at 83–85.
See id.
300
See id.
301
See id.
302
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.
303
MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.
304
MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.
305
See 2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 8.04 (3d ed.
2006) (stating “[t]he intent of the liberal notice pleading system is to ensure that claims are
determined on their merits rather than through missteps in pleading.”).
306
See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496
F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing the intent and purposes behind liberal notice
pleading under the federal rules and the impracticality of imposing formalized pleading
requirements to large, complex cases).
307
Id. at 780 (citing Am. Nurses’ Assoc. v. Illinois, 783 F.3d 716, 723 (7th Cir.
1986); Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 404 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff’d., 473 U.S. 606 (1985)).
299
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Yet the rules also should not obligate parties to spend thousands, and
in some cases millions, of dollars defending themselves against meritless
claims that can never be proven because the factual matter alleged signals no
reasonably founded hope that discovery will yield the required proof.308 A
pleading standard that cares little or not at all about the legal sufficiency of a
claim’s factual allegations would permit a plaintiff to waste the time and
money of others, needlessly giving settlement value to a worthless claim.309
Minnesota needs a pleading standard that avoids all of these abuses and
shortcomings.310
The plausibility standard, properly understood and applied, solves
the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox in accordance with Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01
by making the success of a claim for relief depend upon the legal sufficiency
of the pleading’s factual allegations themselves instead of evidence that
discovery might produce. 311 It requires that claims for relief possess a
minimal level of focus that gives the parties a better understanding of the
claim and enhances the court’s ability to manage discovery issues. 312 By
describing the minimum requirement for legally sufficient pleading under
Rule 8.01, the plausibility standard fits within the overall purpose of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and enhances the thematic harmony of
those rules.313
Rule 8.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure requires every
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim to allege “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .
.”314 According to this rule’s plain language, it is the claimant’s “short and
plain statement of the claim,” not evidence obtained through discovery,
which must show the pleader’s entitlement to relief. 315 The required
“showing” is not one of proof but of demonstration through alleged facts.316
The claim’s factual matter, however alleged, must indicate or suggest the
claimant’s entitlement to relief under the liability theories asserted. 317 A
claim that merely accuses another party of wrongdoing, without stating any
factual matter describing the wrongful conduct, does not show or explain in
any factual way why the pleader is entitled to the relief sought.318 As such, it
308

See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005).
See id.
310
See supra text accompanying notes 305–309 (discussing the abuses and
shortcomings of the current pleading standard).
311
See supra text accompanying notes 85–88 (discussing the pleading standard of
evidence educed through discovery).
312
See supra text accompanying notes 85–88 (discussing the pleading standard of
evidence educed through discovery).
313
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1; supra text accompanying notes 303–312 (discussing
how the plausibility standard comports with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure).
314
MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01 (emphasis added).
315
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
316
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
317
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
318
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
309
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fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and should be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12.02(e).319
The juxtaposition of these rules tells us as the High Court recognized
in Twombly that claims for relief which fail to contain legally sufficient facts
supporting the liability theories asserted are not entitled to discovery. 320
Hence, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure themselves permit district
courts to dispose of claims for relief which fail to allege factual matter
supporting the liability theories asserted.321 This result is just because claims
for relief that cannot show or demonstrate entitlement to relief through
legally sufficient factual allegations do not comply with Rule 8.01 which
requires substantive as well as procedural notice of the claims presented.322
Read and applied literally, the Franklin rule prevents Rule 12.02(e)
from operating as designed by absolving the pleader of having to comply
with the substantive notice obligation that Rule 8.01 imposes.323 By its literal
terms, the Franklin rule makes the legal sufficiency of a claim for relief, as
well as the success of a Rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss, depend on facts
proven from evidence obtained through discovery. 324 It is impossible to
know at the pleading stage what facts the claimant might prove or what
evidence the claimant might produce. 325 Indeed, Franklin itself holds that
proof problems “cannot be reached or resolved short of a motion for
summary judgment or a trial.”326 A pleading standard premised on what the
claimant ultimately can prove practically guarantees the failure of any Rule
12.02(e) motion challenging the legal sufficiency of factual allegations to
state valid claims for relief.327 Thus, the Franklin rule, literally understood
and applied, actually prevents the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure from
operating as designed and militates against the overarching goal of civil
procedure: “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.”328
The plausibility standard, on the other hand, acknowledges that Rule
8.01 really means something when it requires the short and plain statement of
the claim to show or demonstrate the pleader’s entitlement to relief.329 An
319
320

See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e).
See supra text accompanying notes 121–141 (discussing the rule set out in

Twombly).

321
322
323
324

See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01; MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e).
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
See supra text accompanying note 83 (stating the rule set out in Franklin).
See supra text accompanying notes 85–88 (expanding upon the rule set out in

Franklin).

325

See supra text accompanying note 88 (showing the court acknowledged this in

Franklin).

326
327

N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Minn. 1963).
See supra text accompanying note 88 (discussing this rule as set out in

Franklin).

328
329

MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility

standard).
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example illustrates this point. Suppose a plaintiff named Smith interposes a
complaint against Jones following an automobile accident by alleging:
1.
Plaintiff Smith is a citizen of the state of Minnesota
and resides in the County of Hennepin.
2.
Defendant Jones is a citizen of the state of
Minnesota and resides in the County of Ramsey.
3.
On December 20, 2011, a vehicle owned and
operated by Defendant Jones collided with the vehicle
owned and Operated by Plaintiff Smith.
4.

Defendant Jones was negligent.

5.
The collision caused severe and permanent bodily
injury to Plaintiff Smith resulting in disability for 60 days or
more.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Smith prays for judgment
against Defendant Jones in excess of $50,000, including
reasonable costs, disbursements, and such other relief as the
court deems equitable and just.
This hypothetical complaint simply accuses Jones of negligence without
adequately explaining in factual terms what made him negligent. Under the
facts alleged (i.e., the two vehicles collided), it is possible that Jones’ vehicle
collided with Smith’s vehicle because Jones failed to keep a careful look out,
was driving too fast, or failed to yield a right of way. Yet under the same
facts, it also is possible that Jones’ vehicle collided with Smith’s vehicle
because Jones had an unexpected heart attack and died. In Minnesota, it is
“the settled rule that the mere occasion of injury does not in itself support an
inference of negligence.”330 The above hypothetical complaint simply alleges
the mere occasion for injury without alleging factual matter providing a basis
for accusing Jones of negligence. It alleges only a possible claim for relief,
making it subject to dismissal under the plausibility standard.331
Yet the plausibility standard does not represent a return to common
law or code pleading, nor should courts and lawyers treat it that way. 332
Twombly itself acknowledges that a complaint does not have to state

330
331

Lenz v. Johnson, 122 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Minn. 1963).
See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility

standard).

332
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 89–94 (2007) (per curiam).
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“detailed factual allegations” in order to survive a motion to dismiss.333 The
High Court’s decision in Erickson, decided between Twombly and Iqbal, said
nothing indicating that Twombly’s plausibility standard is a reversion to a
more rigid, formalistic pleading style.334 Similarly, Iqbal acknowledges that
Rule 8, which itself demands factual allegations showing entitlement to
relief, “marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . .”335 Thus, the High Court’s own
statements clearly note that the plausibility standard does not signal a return
to formalistic pleading practices of an earlier era.336
Opinions from various United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
recognize this point and apply the plausibility standard accordingly.337 For
example, the Eighth Circuit recognized that Iqbal and Twombly “did not
abrogate the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2),” 338 and held that a
plaintiff claiming employer’s liability under Missouri law could merely
allege that he was the defendants’ employee without alleging specific facts
indicative of the alleged employment relationship.339 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit held that all a plaintiff needed to do to state an actionable claim for
unlawful discrimination in residential real estate transactions was to identify
the type of discrimination that occurred and when it happened.340 It reached
that conclusion by recognizing that the plausibility standard does not amount
to “a sub rosa campaign to reinstate the old fact-pleading system called for
by the Field Code or even more modern codes.”341 Within a year after the
High Court decided Twombly, the Third Circuit disavowed the notion that
claimants must plead elemental facts to state a viable claim for relief, noting
that the plausibility standard simply requires the pleading of facts suggesting
a claim’s required elements,342 and criticizing “an unduly crabbed reading of
the complaint” as denying the plaintiff “the inferences to which her
complaint is entitled.”343 In remanding the case for further proceedings, the
Third Circuit directed the district court to provide the plaintiff with an
opportunity to amend her complaint with respect to certain claims.344
Given the fact that a valid claim for relief needs only to suggest a
claim’s required elements, the prior hypothetical complaint may be corrected
333

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 89–94.
335
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
336
See supra text accompanying notes 332–335 (explaining why the plausibility
standard is not a return to previous pleading practices).
337
See Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010); Swanson v. Citibank,
N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2010); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–35
(3d Cir. 2008).
338
Hamilton, 621 F.3d at 817.
339
See id. at 818–19.
340
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 405.
341
Id. at 404.
342
See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35.
343
Id. at 237.
344
Id. at 246.
334
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with minimal effort. 345 Because the plausibility standard does not require
particularized pleading except where the claim alleges fraud or mistake,
correcting pleading deficiencies should be relatively easy in most cases
under the plausibility standard. 346 For example, the prior hypothetical
complaint could be corrected with minimal effort:
1.
Plaintiff Smith is a citizen of the state of Minnesota
and resides in the County of Hennepin.
2.
Defendant Jones is a citizen of the state of
Minnesota and resides in the County of Ramsey.
3.
On December 20, 2011, Defendant Jones
negligently operated his motor vehicle so as to cause it to
collide with a vehicle owned and operated by Plaintiff
Smith.
4.
The collision caused severe and permanent bodily
injury to Plaintiff Smith resulting in disability for 60 days or
more.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Smith prays for judgment
against Defendant Jones in excess of $50,000, including
reasonable costs, disbursements, and such other relief as the
court deems equitable and just.
Every negligence claim consists of four elements: duty, breach, causation,
and damages.347 The foregoing allegations suggest that Jones owed a legal
duty to Smith by alleging that Jones owned and operated a motor vehicle.
They suggest a breach of that duty by alleging that Jones negligently
operated his vehicle. While this allegation amounts to a mixed statement of
law and fact, it is sufficient to alert Jones that Smith’s claim focuses on
Jones’ lack of reasonable care in driving, even if the precise lack of care at
issue can be determined only through discovery.348 Causation and damages
are plainly alleged as factual conclusions. The ease with which a claimant
can modify a claim to make it comply with the plausibility standard suggests
345
346

standard).

See id. at 234–35.
See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility

347

Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982).
The flexibility of allowing parties to plead mixed statements of law and fact is
essential to efficient pleading, “otherwise pleadings would become intolerably prolix, and
mere statements of the evidence.” Clark v. Chi., Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 9 N.W. 75,
75 (Minn. 1881). The plausibility standard does not prohibit pleading allegations which
amount to mixed statements of law and fact. See Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 716, 818–19 (8th
Cir. 2010).
348
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that courts should allow a claimant to defend against a Rule 12.02(e) motion
by demonstrating the ability to cure the pleading deficiency through
amendment.349
The plausibility standard also helps keep litigation costs in check by
ensuring that only well-pled claims are subject to discovery.350 Under the
Franklin rule’s literal application, claims for relief proceed to discovery even
though they fail to comply with the requirement of Rule 8.01. 351 The
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, like their federal counterpart, frame the
scope of discovery in terms of the claims and defenses asserted in the
action.352 The cost of discovery necessarily increases every time a claim that
is not properly pled passes to the discovery phase.353 The discovery process,
particularly with the advent of electronic discovery, becomes an
unnecessarily time consuming and expensive excursion when the facts
alleged fail to indicate that the claimant has any reasonably founded hope of
obtaining relevant evidence through the use of discovery procedures.354 The
plausibility standard enables courts and parties to maintain focused discovery
while controlling the associated expenses.355
The plausibility standard also enhances a thematic harmony within
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure just as it does within the Federal
Rules. 356 In 1997, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the Celotex
trilogy as “instructive” with respect to Minnesota’s summary judgment
procedure.357 This recognition has prompted the Minnesota Court of Appeals
three years later to recognize that summary judgment is “‘an integral part’ of
civil procedure, not a ‘disfavored procedural shortcut,’ and is ‘designed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”358
In effect, Minnesota’s appellate courts, like the federal courts, have backed
away from the notion that summary judgment is a disfavored procedural
tool. 359 Rather in Minnesota courts, as in the federal courts, summary
judgment simply is another procedural tool permitting the early disposal of
claims lacking evidentiary support post-discovery. 360 The plausibility
standard similarly would make Rule 12.02(e) an integral part of Minnesota’s
civil procedure by enabling already over-burdened and underfunded district
349
350

standard).

351
352
353
354
355

standard).

FED. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e).
See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility
See supra text accompanying note 83 (stating the rule set out in Franklin).
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) with MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(a).
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559–60 (2007).
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 (explaining the plausibility

356

See supra text accompanying notes 131–137 and 303–313.
See DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 70 (Minn. 1997).
358
Dixon v. Depositors Ins. Co., 619 N.W.2d 752, 757 (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)).
359
See id.
360
See id.
357
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courts to dispose of claims unsupported by legally sufficient factual
allegations.361
Therefore, the time has come for Minnesota formally to adopt
Twombly’s plausibility standard as the pleading standard applicable to claims
for relief in all civil actions brought in the State’s district courts.362 Having
already applied the plausibility standard in Hebert and Bahr, it only seems
logical that the Minnesota Supreme Court should retire the Franklin rule
(though not its holding) as “an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted
pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint.” 363 Accordingly, the Franklin rule, like the Conley rule,
“describe[s] the breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint
claims, not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a
complaint’s survival.”364 The Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox will continue to
foster confusion about the requirement for adequate pleading in state civil
actions until the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly adopts the plausibility
standard.365
D. Although the Plausibility Standard Acceptably Solves the Bahr-HebertFranklin Paradox, Important Considerations Remain
At least two important considerations remain even if the Minnesota
Supreme Court formally adopts the plausibility standard. 366 One
consideration is whether the plausibility standard will result in an increased
use of Rule 12.02(e) to dispose of claims.367 Underlying this consideration is
the concern that an increase in Rule 12.02(e) motions will inundate an
overburdened and underfunded district court system.368 In response to those
pressures, a secondary concern is that district courts would overzealously
apply the plausibility standard simply to clear dockets.
A recent Federal Judicial Center study conducted for the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules indicates that this

361

See MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e); supra text accompanying notes 131–137
(explaining the plausibility standard).
362
See supra text accompanying notes 346–361; supra infra text accompanying
notes 363–365 (setting forth the reasons Minnesota should adopt Twombly’s plausibility
standard).
363
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
364
Id.
365
See supra Part IV.A (explaining how Hebert created the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin
paradox).
366
See infra text accompanying notes 367–379 (stating the important
considerations remaining).
367
See supra text accompanying notes 356–361 (explaining the use of Rule
12.02(e)).
368
See supra text accompanying notes 356–361 (explaining the use of Rule
12.02(e)).
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consideration may not be as profound as some might expect.369 That study
“compared motion activity in 23 federal district courts in 2006 and 2010 and
included an assessment of the outcome of motions in orders that do not
appear in the computerized legal reference systems such as Westlaw.”370 It
used statistical models “to control for such factors as differences in levels of
motion activity in individual federal district courts and types of cases.”371
The study found that the filing rate of motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim generally increased from 2006 to 2010.372 However, the rate at which
courts granted motions to dismiss in general without leave to amend did not
increase.373 Moreover, the study showed no increase from 2006 to 2010 in
the rate at which motions to dismiss terminated cases.374
A second important consideration is whether courts should apply the
plausibility standard to affirmative defenses. 375 The federal circuits,
including the Eighth Circuit, have yet to decide that question.376 Presently
that question divides the judges of the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota.377 Some of the judges have held that the plausibility
standard does not apply to affirmative defenses. 378 Others have taken the
opposite view, holding that affirmative defenses also are subject to the
plausibility standard.379
A careful review of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure indicates
that the plausibility standard should not apply to affirmative defenses.380 As
noted above, the plausibility standard derives from Rule 8.01, which requires
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
369

See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J.
BATAILLON, MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ( 2011), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf.
370
CECIL ET AL., supra note 369, at 13.
371
Id. at 7.
372
Id. at 7–12.
373
Id. at 12–16.
374
Id.
375
See infra text accompanying notes 376–378 (discussing whether the court
should apply the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses).
376
See infra notes 378–379 (showing that although federal circuits have yet to
decide this question many district courts have).
377
See infra notes 378–379 and accompanying text (showing judges are divided
on this issue).
378
See U.S. Bank, Nat’l Assoc., v. Educ. Loans, Inc., Civ. No. 11-1445
(RHK/JJG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131453, at *15–16 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2011) (holding
that the plausibility standard does not apply to affirmative defenses); accord. Schlief v. NuSource, Inc., Civ. No. 10-4477 (DWF/SER), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44446 at *22–25 (D.
Minn. April 25, 2011); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1051 (D.
Minn. 2010).
379
See Ahle v. Veracity Research Co., 738 F.Supp.2d 896, 924–25 (D. Minn.
2010) (applying the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses); accord. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266 F.R.D. 260, 268 (D. Minn. 2009).
380
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
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to relief . . . .”381 Unlike its federal counterpart, Rule 8.01 specifically lists
the kinds of pleadings setting forth a claim for relief as: “an original claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim . . . .” 382 Rule 8.02, a
completely separate rule, applies to general defenses.383 They need only be
stated “in short and plain terms” and consist only of admissions, denials, or a
lack of “knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
of an averment.”384 Rule 8.03 applies to affirmative defenses.385 But unlike
Rule 8.01, neither Rule 8.02 nor 8.03 requires that any defense, be it general
or affirmative, be accompanied by any short and plain statement showing the
defendant’s entitlement to raise any defense.386 Moreover, defenses, be they
general or affirmative, by definition do not state claims, i.e., an “aggregate of
operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.”387 Rather, a
defense merely is a “stated reason why the plaintiff or prosecutor has no
valid case.”388 Although the defendant bears the burden of proof with respect
to affirmative defenses, they really amount to pleas in avoidance, not claims
of entitlement to relief or remedy. 389 Accordingly, it would seem that the
plausibility standard should not apply to affirmative defenses raised in an
answer or other responsive pleading given the plain language of Minn. R.
Civ. P. 8.390
V. CONCLUSION
Minnesota’s pleading and Rule 12 jurisprudence presently states a
paradox. 391 The Franklin rule leads us to believe that almost any kind of
factual allegations suffice to state a legally viable claim for relief because a
Rule 12.02(e) motion’s success depends on what facts the plaintiff ultimately
might prove.392 Hebert and Bahr, on the other hand, say that a complaint that
merely alleges legal conclusions does not suffice, thereby conditioning the
viability of a claim for relief on what the plaintiff has alleged, as opposed to
what the plaintiff might prove. 393 Although Hebert and Bahr embrace
Twombly’s analysis to varying degrees, neither expressly adopts Twombly’s
plausibility standard, nor do those cases attempt to explain how the Franklin
381
382
383
384
385
386

8.01.

387
388
389
390
391
392
393

MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.01.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.02.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.02.
MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.03.
Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.02 and MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.03 with MINN. R. CIV. P.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009).
Id. at 482.
See id.
See MINN. R. CIV. P. 8.
See supra Part IV (explaining the current Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox).
See supra Part IV.A (explaining the rule set out in Franklin).
See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox).
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rule squares with Twombly’s analysis and the plausibility standard from
which it flows.394
The time is ripe for the Minnesota Supreme Court to decide whether
to accept the plausibility standard for evaluating whether claims for relief are
properly pled. If adopted in Minnesota, the plausibility standard would
acceptably solve the Bahr-Hebert-Franklin paradox.395 Consistent with Rule
8.01, the standard would require district courts faced with Rule 12.02(e)
motions to focus on the legal sufficiency of the factual matter alleged rather
than what the claimant ultimately might prove through evidence adduced in
discovery. 396 The standard is flexible enough to allow claimants to plead
claims easily and sufficiently structured to define the issues to be litigated in
a way that controls discovery costs and contributes to efficient case
management. 397 Moreover, the plausibility standard enhances the thematic
harmony of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure by making Rule 12
motion practice an integral part of those Rules and allowing that procedure to
function in a manner consistent with their purpose.398 Thus, it makes sense
that the Minnesota Supreme Court should expressly adopt the plausibility
standard as the rule for judging the legal sufficiency of claims for relief in
Minnesota at its earliest opportunity.399
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See supra Part IV.A (discussing how Hebert created a paradox).
See supra Part IV.C (explaining how the plausibility standard solves the BahrHebert-Franklin paradox).
396
See supra Part IV.C (discussing the plausibility standard).
397
See supra Part IV.C (discussing the plausibility standard).
398
See supra Part IV.C (discussing how the plausibility standard comports with
the purpose behind the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure).
399
See supra Part IV.C (explaining why the plausibility standard should be
adopted).
395
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